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THE  El_;P.OPEA:"oi  l''\410!\i  A1'4D  THE  lf.)SUE  OF C01\FI.I(TS  1:\  AFRICA: 
PEACE-BliiLDI~G. C01'4f1.J(T  PRf.VE~TIO~  -\~l' BEYO~D Jntt'Oduction 
THF. WIWPt:AN UNION  ANI> lllt: lSStlE 01' CON~l.Wl'S IN  AFRI('A: 
t••:ACE-8UIWJNt;, CONI-l.J<T I'REVENT!ON  ANI>  BEYOND 
Tne  growing  number  of violent  confl1cts  Jn  Africa  represents  a  major  challenge  to  the 
international community. Most of these conflicts are intra-state wars, di reeled mainly against 
civilians and often  fought  by  m;\itia<;  that  are difficult to control. Thes;! conflicts result  in 
mcreasing human suffenng and loss of life. ihe creation of massive movements of re!"'ugees. 
devastating  effects  on  local  and  regional  economies  as  well  as  on  the  environment,  and 
serious threats to the v1abditv of ne1ghbouring countries and populations  They can even lead 
to the implosiOn of states and maJor human1tanan  traged1es. 
While the mternat1onal community 1s  contmuously called upon to handle these conf11cts.  the 
usual  ad-hoc  employment  of 1ts  traditional  instruments.  tn  particular  UN  peace-keeping 
ope:-ations and human1tana:1  a1d,  has proved costly. sometimes ineffecti,·e or even counter-
productive  m  relation  to  the  longer-term  goal  of return  to  a  nt)n-violent.  stable and self-
:-;u~tamablc situation  At  a  t1nH:  of  incrca::.1n~: donor fatq;uc  a~ f;Jr  as fmanc1al  commitments 
arc  concerned.  much  needed  mtcrnat1onal  development  ass• stance  IS  thus  channelled  into 
en1crg•:ncy  aid and. <:ven  111  th.:  lnng~·r term.  Ct1nc~·ntratcd 011  m.:asur.:'- Ilk.:  mmc-clear:mc.:. 
dc-mobllt'><ltJon of combatants and  re-buddin!: of  mfraslJuctur.: 
Ampl1f1ed by  th:: Somalia expencnce. tht: 1nternat10nal  discus~Jnn about poss1ble measures h) 
better prevent.  ma:-~age and re:-.olvc  conf11ch  111  Afnca IS  evolvmg rapidly  The  deliberation~ 
vvzth1n  a numher of maJOr  mtt:rnational organuat;ons (UN. EU/\\'U!. OECD. G7. OAU etc). 
and  many governmental  ar1d  non-governmental  mit1at1ves a-; .well  as numerous conferences. 
semmars and acadern!c  publication~ all  feed 1nto  th1s  comple-..  dtscussJOII  !hat  mcludes such 
d1vers  tss:;e:s  as  early  \~ammg systems on  .::ommun11v  lc'l:el  or the enhancement of African· 
peace-keeping capac1 11t.-s 
The European l!nJOn  ts he.wdv concerned hv·  the 1ssue of conllicb 111  :\fnc:t  This IS not only 
because  the  mternattOnal  d1scuss1on  nece~.~11ates  an  adequate  response  of the  Un10n.  not 
merely because of the moral obligat1on to reduce l'uman  suffcnn~  ..  nor stmply the obllgat10n 
to  use 11s  resources  111  th<"  mo'>t  me:!nmgful  wav  For  the  European  I !mon. the existence oC 
VIOlent  confl1cts  111  Afr;ca 1<.  mcr..:asmt~ly challengmg tht:  ach1e..-ement of II' declared polic\· 
goals  Fostenng peace. stabdJty. democracy and human nghts under the cond1t1ons of  conflicts 
15  a  nearly 1mposs1hle task 
I.  A  BASIC APPROACH TO ll!E ISSUE  OF ("0:'-0 Fl.ICT'S  IN  A F'RI('A 
rollowmg the long and mtenSI\'C diSCU'SSlOns  withm the J:uropcan UniOn that resulted 
m  the  c<;tabhshmcnt  of a  has•c  documt"nt  on  "Prc\·cnttvc  d1rlomacy  and  pcacc-
kcepmg m  /\fnc;(, the C.)UnCII,  1r1  Its conclustons on "Prcven11vc d1plomaL)', conflict 
rc.-solut10n  and peJCC·kccprng tn  Afnca~ of 4  December  I Q95. has  ~et out $0mc b<t."ic 
gUlddmes  and  prme~ples concernrng  the  Umon's  response  toward~  the  issue  of 
ronf1~tts m  Afnca  TI1c mam fni:us of these Counc1l  conclusron~ he5 •m  sltuattOns of 
open c:•'tl war or s1tuat1ons where the outbre.ak of v;olc::ncc 1s  mHmncrtt. w.ch explicu 
r~f-:retocc~ to the role of the WEU m  hclpmg 10 carry out linton  ac~tOn<;, a" \VCII  a<> 
en 7he ne:d lo ~trpport Afucan ar.tJvllre5 conccmmr! wnf11ct prcvcntl•)f1. managcmcn1 
;>end  rC".olut!rm  ( c;;panry -bmldmg) Although  the  means available  to  the  i:uropean  Union  are  limited  compared to the 
magnitude of the task of effectively preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in 
Afnca, the  Union  should aspire to  maximise its  leverage through an optimal use of 
it"  instrument~ and  resourus.  Therefore,  the  European  Union  should  develop  a 
comprehensive and  pro-active approach along with  the guidelines and principles of 
the  Council  conclusions  This approach  should  be  pro-active because the European 
Un10n,  without pre-Judging the basic principle that Africans arc primarily responsil:,le 
for  handlint; the issue of violent conflicts, has not only an  important interest but also 
an  1111portant  potent1al  for  act1vcly  addressing  this  issue  The approach  should  be 
comprehensive  1n  so  far  as  the  European  Union,  within  its  compc:tencies,  should 
address the  entire cycle of conflict  and  peace 
While  the  Eu10pean  Un1on  has  to  be  prepared  to  respond  to  situations of violent 
contl!ct:;  ;n  :\fr1ca  rap1dly  and  m a  reasonable  manner,  it  goes  without saying that 
~ffecl!veJy prewntmg conf11cts  is  better than  responding  to  their consequences.  As 
ntl  ;~mount of humanitarian aid  and  no  effective peace-keeping operation  will  solve 
;l  cn~h of peace  and  security, JUstice  and  resources in  a sustainable way, there is  a 
need  to  trv  to  go  heyond  ad-hoc  decisions  and  a  policy  of damage  limitation. 
l'urthcrmNc_ responding to  the  effects of violent conflicts in  Africa has become an 
e-;1rcmcl\·  costlv  endeavour 
In  \IC\'. of all  thc~c con-;!deratlons. the  prevention of conflicts should be at  the centre 
of a  comprt.'hcn~1ve rc~pon~e of the  h~ropean Union  towards the issue of conflicts in 
·\fnca 
:\  ha~1c  prc-rt:quJ\11<:  for  opt111117.1ng  the  Union\  mstruments  IS  a  high  degree of 
information  rxchanj!r. common  analysis,  coonlination and cooperation  within  the 
L:n1on  but also  w1th  other members of •he international community and in  particular 
with  the rcc1p1ents  of ass1qancc 
In  all  phases of the  process. care sh<Juld  be  taken  to  intel!rate the African debate on the 
subJect_ and not  to  nnro~e solutrons but to  point to options and alternatives  At the end, 
it will  drprnd on  Africans thrmselvrs as to  how far  they  are determined to  engage in 
confl1.:1  r:~c\"l'ntlon.  management  ;md  resolution,  and  to  hurld  the  mstitutions  and 
estahl1sh  thc  pol1c\  mechamsms that  make a v1ablc state 
2.  Stmrtural stabililv as  the  ultimatr policy  !!Oal 
Every  carefullv  des1gned  pol1cy  needs  an  overall  aun  that.  rdeally.  all  actrvities and 
measures  sh,)ufd  serve  The  establishment  of an  ultimate  policy  goal  for  activities 
concernmg conll1cts  111  Afnca will  greatly  facllrtate a pro-active and  ta~eted policy, it 
will  facdrtatc the des1gn  and  1mplementat1on of measures 1n  all  phases of the cycle of 
confl1ct  and  peace 
(j,vcn the fact  that (t J experience shows that lack of development is  not the only major 
source  of v1olent  confltct.  that  (rr)  the  EU  policy  a1rns  concerning  Africa  might  be 
5urnm.1r1zcd  a~ hc!ptng  fO losrcr peace w1d srahilin-.  dct·elopmcnt.  dcmocmcy and the 
rc<J•··cr ttf hum,vi np,hr.1.  that (111)  those aims arc interdependent/mutually re-enforcing; 
and th:;:  (J\·)  ~ust.1.int'd dt'\·rlopmrnt is often interpreted m a narrow economic sense, the 
\:ltln.ttc rol1cy  goal  could  be  summarized under the  term  structural stability. 
\:wctur.!1  <.t:~bd1tv  IS  to  be  understood  a_<;  a  wnn  denoting  a  dynamic  situation,  a 
~,r:u;~:10r1  .~f st:Jbd1ty  able to  cope with  the dynamics inherent in  (emerging) democratic 
·.ocJ~iH:\  Stmchrral stability could dms be derined as a situation involvmg sustainable 
economic  dc\·,·io;-rnent,  democracy  and  respect  for  human  rights,  viable  political 
';fl:C!urc>. and hcalthy soc1al and cnvuonmcntal conditions, with the capacity to manage 
chant;': v•1thour tn  re~nt to vtolcnt conflict.  Workanl~ towards structural stability would mean the target:!d  n~inforccment of those factors  that enable peaceful  rh?.ng~. 
Operating with the term  structural stability  in  no  way  implies a major departure from 
the  current  policies of the  European  Union.  As  it  goes  without saying that  economic 
development  and  prosperity  are  m;;jor  factors  for  ensuring  non-violent  change, 
sustainable development is a central objective fo•· the attainment of stmctural stability. 
Operating  with  the term structural stability  rather means to  give expression to the fact 
that working towards economic development alone is insufficient for an  effective policy 
ofpcace-bui],hng and connie! prevention, that the policy goals sust::unablc development, 
democracy  and  human  nghts,  viable pol!ttcal  structures, healthy social  conditions and 
healthy  environmental  condition~: arc  interdependent  which  implies  the  need  for  a 
comprehensive approach 
Development  assistance  has  always  been  intended  as  an  instrument  of stabilizing 
societies, and  the necessity to engage in  building viable political structures IS  generally 
undisputed  Assistance  for  democratisation,  institution  building,  strengthening  civil 
soc1ety  and  so  on  have  become explicit  objectives of most  aid  donors.  What is  still 
lllJSSing.  however.  is  not  only  the  proper identification of l.ow the  available resources 
could be  used  most effectively concerning a particular country in  a particular situation 
but  also  the  linkag~  between  this  'political'  assistance,  development  aid,  and  the 
tradl!lonJI  foreign  pol1cy  Instruments  (political  dialogue  etc)  The  acceptance  of 
<.tructural  stahtl1ty  as  the  ult1mate  pol1cy  go::tl  1s  an  cxp1cssion  or the  fact  that  such  a 
l1nkag~ 1s  necc~~ary 
3.  'lhc irnport.anrc  o_f  tlw  politiral analnis of stmrturat mot-rauscs or ronnirt-; 
The capac1ty  of political  an::dys1s  that  focuses on  root-causes of connicts is  central to 
thc largctcd dcploylllcnt or  a~'''tance and  an  effcclivc and cons1stcnt poltcy conccrnmg 
the  l<.sue or conn1cts 1n  t\fnca 111  general  Such an  an:~lysJs, focus1ng not only on events 
but  also on  political  ;11HI  socio-economic structures. wdl help to  detect  ma1or obstacles 
to  \he  v1abtl1ty  of a  ~tate and/or  pol1cy  mcchan1sms  that  carry  the  seeds  of violent 
con fi 1ct  On the h::tsi s of tll!S analy5i s. options for targeted measures could be developed. 
areas of act1v1t1es or of adJustment of current p0licies defined  Relevant for the analysis 
are  1n  particular  interest  and  power constellatiOns  of d1fferent  identit)'·  groups.  their 
resources and  needs.  their  level  of mtcrdependence, their disposition  towards the use 
of VIOlence,  and  the cx1stence of effective mechanrsms for  the peaceful conciliation of 
group mterests 
A  country-by-country  I  rcgion-by-reg1on  analysis  resulting  in  the  establishment  or 
comprehensive  policy  framewod<.~ could  also  po111t  to  certain  prionl)'  areas  and  111 
particular to  the  long-term options  As  peace and security arc closely  interlinked with 
economic  and  soc1al  development,  an  adequate  combination  of pl>litical,  economic. 
legal. social, environmental  and, as far  as helpful  and  feasible, also  military  measures 
of stabi I· ·ation  1  n  the  above  mentioned  sense  should  be  considered  within  these 
frameworks in  the  sense that their potential  for  addressing the root-causes of violent 
conflicts  IS  fully  taken  into  account,  in  particular  their  potential  for  balancing  the 
interests and opporltmlties of different Identity groups within  a state,  for  encouraging 
a democratic government that  enjoys widespread legitimacy among the population. for 
fostenng  a  consensus  on  key  national  1ssucs  ("nation-buildmg")  and  for  building 
mecharw:ms for  the  peaceful conciliation of group interests ("targeted assistance") 
.-\nalystng the root-causes of African conflicts ultimately means touching upon the issue 
of the d1stribut10n of power and  re~ources within a state and, in  a wider  ~.:nse, of forms 
of democracy, autonomy, self-governance and so on. This crucial issue should be given 
a central  role  111  del1berations on  stability, equity  and  legitimacy. II. A SIJRV£\' Of' AC11:tl.@J" TilE Dlf'fEiU:NT snlJATIOSS 01' CUNH..KJ: 6ND  !>LU~  WijER,t 
DOF$ 'ntE fo:UKOI'f.AN  tiNIO~ COM£. rN!  . 
~----------
(itVCII the cornple~tly of th~ I~">UC or COHI11cb Ill Afm:a. an anal~  \leal dtsJmction bet\\-een 
dtfft:rcr•t  '>tluaiHlll'> n!  cotlf11cl and rx-::ct:  se~:rns hdpful  Wtuk HI  ca(h of these SIIUllllons 
~.pcuftc  llll.:;t\Wt:~  rr1nv;~  to  ·i,~:  forefrunt  tl  :J10uld  ht:  dear  that  111  praciKC.  ther..- ts  no 
ckar ·cui dn  1duH~ lin•:  hd  •~c~n th.:- ddfcH·ut -.umt!tt•n..,  WHi  ddkr  •:Ill  11h."astuc~. 
{··~II<:! alh  ·.p~·a~.Hif'.  the  I lH«p..:dn  t Jm,•n  -.hould  J;~~.c  an  alltvt: -,!<'Jin:  on the  •~sue and, 
1111  tht·  io;,•.J··.  nl  ,·,.l.:tll\ .·,j ·''"'"' \l·.  ,f,.,t,ld  ;t'>flllt' to  U'·'-'  t'>,hlttl)'  tll'.lltl!lll'llh  111  the  l!l<hl 
lll<:illlllll',!ul  ,,,1·,  l•l'>  ..  lllh  !!,,.  1:u,!!  ol  ">lllldUIJ.I  -.t;;!ult:;  ll11·.  tlllp!il''•  th;H  til~·  h,_·,t 
comlHoJito:; 1•!  ..1!1  ·"·;uhhk om!tumcnh 1., deployed  In  till~ l.:"'>l't'll,  th~· Uruou l>huuiJ also 
<:fl!',d~~t.'  II\  '>liW.uL.H!II!'  lhr~  Jc-hiil<:"  on  the  I '>'>UC,  Ill efll\Hll abmg  dlt:~'I!\'C  (\X)pt:r  l!!!Oil of 
;u·ttn~ If! tho:  hdd u!  f"":Jc~:·buddlll;~. conlllCI prc\·cnlw!l, m:tnagcmcul i1nd  !t"'>Oluuun, and 
1r1  •:n<•H!I,,.t;•n~:  t<'u•,n,d  .,nJ  ..,ub·rc~''-•!l:ll  cconom1;:  1111~~(al1on  ·n,e  turop~:an Unwn 
'.ilr~tlld  al•n  h.:li•  l•'  t·wid  ~he Ulfl,i;:!lln pf other  actor:.  lu  cff~:..:trvd\  (11Eage  111  1hc~t 
::ll!\  IIi<"• 
:\•,  1!  \\ill!·.,· ltlq,.,.,  .. ,f,\v  tP d..:\dop J.n  \>\·.:rail  b!uepr1111  for  a<:IH.tn.  thr:  fnlltw.-mg  SUntt>y 
uf mca'u"·' thlli  dl('  f  uwr~~rw• l 'n.iuu  could ~.  supp(H1  or ath ocalr '' mtcndcd as a 
l'l'PI t'l ;tl  ;wflltGd  <.>II cn':I!J• m 
·1  If!·.  ;·  the  '.JlJ,,,r,,~,  \\h,~rt'  th~·  I.'PWttrv  ,.,  '>ecuungh  ,l:tbit- ;md  l;ugdy  qutcl  but 
"her,· (·.ii•J<.llll.d) .... ,,r;_,_  ...  ol  potl'H!l,d UHl!lll'! mav  b~· dt'-t:t'ffH:d  h11 c\ampk, the 
l\J!hl~lll[  !ll;tlf'Hl;dl'>::ll\•1:  t>f  .111  ltl1Jltl/1ant  !lllllOIIIV  01  !he  U:O:l'  Of  !Cpft'SSI\'t' 
lll~!rtl•··ll'lll•- It\  th•:  at".l'fli <:  nf ,·llnt.H' m.:chant'-.111'.  forth~ p.:ac~fttl connltatton of 
dt\l"l)'<•ll[  l'.fllll;' J!lklo".{', 
lnltn~·d1.tl<: :n!li'.  1\·.tu:-lnl!ldtfl!:  l:\t;thll  ... hnlt'rtl  ·  urHkr  r•:•.ptTt ,,f lktnucr;t~)­
:H!d  fund:on.:~llal  twmart  r  t~hh  ·  of vtablc pnltttcal  and  ~lCIO· 
·:~tnl''rrl:l'  •.:rullur,·-. f nu:chant·.m., ,,,- pe;sn~ful con(ll>atH1n  of 
I n'tr U!llcllh 
IIIIL':t··-1'.  \t:Jblt- r.krnocr:tttt  nwJeJ., and \II l•n) 
I ·''!'''ll:d :l.,,t\l<llll't'  Jfld  tralflllll'" l'dur:ttton. '·••u:d  and ecolllHiliC 
C(lhl·\tO!l,  •.lr<:'l!'lhentll)~ human and  ... n..:tal  r.kvdop111l'lll, 
d,·nwcracv budd1n!:.  gnod ):Uvl'rn;mll' and Ct\d  •.ocH:t)',  mqtiUtton 
hutldmg ctt:, polttll·al r.llaloglJC,  watdung  chaa~;c<;, vmcrng 
~J.!!~tiou of lt•nsiun 
ThiS  I\  the  ~ituatt(Hl  where  conntcl  Ill  SOlrcty  become  clt:arlv  apparent  (SOCial 
unrest.  armt.:J  opposttton.  mas<>  demonstrations etc). The  grav;ty  of the  Situation 
lkpcnds not onlv  on  the  events  thcm~clvcs but  also  on  the existmg political  and 
pnwL'f  structure~ (b the  't-'PIK'SIIton'  able  lo  prc~cnt negot1ablc  demands'7  Is  the 
govctTltnent  m  a  po~it1on to  fulfil  them')  And so  on) 
lr]l T11L'QJale  .<11 ms  ( 'onfl1 ct  prevention (in the  strict sense).  fZcduction of tensions; 
prevention of full  outbreak of hostilities 
lnqr>"l1Cl\b  Political  dialogue with the parties concemed (missions. preventive 
diplomacy): advc,cacy  of specific measures (incl.  preventive 
dcrloymcnt of troops) and/or of specific solutions to  the 
problems; (threat of) sanctions; deployment of observers; own and 
contribution tc other humanitarian I emergency aid (also to 
4 ·., 
',•'  . 
.  .  ~--
·::-,·/'.~.:::.:.:..-:::--,~>-:·>  •"  ·:-~;:.-~  --~·-_ .. : ·.~::,::~  :··  "ll  _~:-':,;:  .  .--·  ·::~~··  _:  t  .• ·- ,_ ... ·•  ".  -"-._  .•  ·.  -~~·-~...:-~·-fY",0•,;,  ...  -·  _<~ 
.  ·· ..  ::. :preyenl refugee. flows ·for. e4:ono.mi c  rea50n.s). 'Peace-:bui lding .  ~t,~·i::~'Yi:.  "~; 
·:: ·  ··. · measur~ eould. cci~t.inue to apply arid. could _even  bc'jntensiti~d:·~:::'i-~U :~\"-lt,~~t 
....... They will have most effect If targeted to  the heart of  the  conflid~·~··:,::~:\''.::&J 
.  . .  .  •  •  .- .  .  .  l.  •  •.  ·.  t ..  <  ~  • 
: (easing the economic situation of a marginalized group while  '  ::  ~·  ·  :.;.,z:./ 
··  offering assistance to the g<wemment 'to· find· a sustainable.  ·  · 
. solution; for  example). 
· ... ,• 
· Open conflict 
'lmm_g!Jiate_aimli.l  (.'onnict.JDJ!!J~1:!..~'.!l~.t:l.L Reducing the threat of vertical and 
horizontal escalation (incl.  the  reduction of immediate human  · · 
suffering and  the  handling  of the  refugee problem). 
InsJrumerr~  Threat of sanctions (incl.  1.0  third countries), political  dialogue, 
own  and  contribution  1:o  other humanitarian I emergency  aid, 
(advocacy of) prcwntive military  intervention; observer 
tmsstons. 
lmmcdi<.!~ ain1s 4 (.9n0ict_LG~.91!l.tiOJ1 Endi.ng  the hostilities and  starting peace 
negotiations. 
Instruments  Sanctions, political  dialogut:,  aJvocacy  of specific solutions, 
. support  for  peace  initiativ·~s. (advocacy of) peace-enforcement. 
Post-conflict situation 
This is  tlhe  situation  where  there  is  no  longer organized armed  violence.  A cease-
fire or a peace agreement might or might  11ot yet have been  already  signed. ln  any 
case,  the:  consequences of the  war  arc  still  present and  obvious  in  a large part of 
the socie:ty  (refugees and ex-combatants still  in  the progress of re-integration etc.), 
and  it  is  still  uncertain  if the  situation  will  deteriorate  (back  into  the  phase  of 
tensions or open  conflict) or improve (tovnrds a situation without obvit'US tensions 
or structural stability). 
lmmedi.H!~  ..  aim~  Connict resolut:on I peace-building  Successful  peace 
negotiations. return  to  normality 
l!lstrutl}ents  Demobilisation  and  disarmament,  repatriation  and  re-integration, 
de~mining, post-conflict relief and humanitarian aid, 
rehabilitation, peace-building measures (see  above),  political 
dialogue, advocacy of specific solutions, watching changes, 
confidence building  mea5.ures,  (support for)  conflict resolution 
initiatives,  re-building of government structures  . 
. Ill. TOWARDS A  POLICY  OF PEACE-BUILDING ANO  CONFLICf-PREVENTION  1: 
· A PPIWA  CH BY AIMS 
·..  '.·:  .·.  . .  .  .  . .. 
Central  to  a  comprehensive approach .and  a more  effective engagement  in  the field  of 
conflict prevention is  a broad definition ofthe term:  "Conflict prevention"  should not 
·only be understood as easing a situation '.'/here  an  o~tbreak 'of violence is imminent ( = ' 
.. ·  .. conflict p're'venti'on  In a narrow sens~) but also .as preventing the occurrence of such  a 
situation { =. conflict :.prevention  in  a wider se111SC).  Activities of conflict p1\Wention in a 
wider sense'sbould  be  summarized ·under the  tenn peace-building. Defined as  such,  a 
policy; of  C9':"f1i~t p_ievention  would apply  m_ai'nly Jri a situation of tensions as described 
.  above.· Pe'aie~tiuilding measures,  by  contrnst, :could  apply  in all  phases of conflict and  ....  _.  .  ' 
'  '  ~  I 
',. ···peste.  However.  as  peace..building  measutes  will  gfllerally  embrate. projects· and 
. programmc..-s with the  Jong~·tenn aim or the stabitimion of societies.  the~r impact will 
be greatest in oonpvio!.ent situations. 
For  a policy  of peate-buildins and confllct  prevention.  three  main  areas of activities 
might  be  disting.ujshed:  (i) enhancing  peace-building  capacities;  (ii) detecting  future 
trou()le spots at a very earl)'  stage~ and (tii) dosing the gnp between analysis and timely 
political action. 
!t Eni@!Sing Katt:Wik!iPJ. £eaitit-s 
The key  for  an  effective EU  policy for peace-building and conflict prevention in Afriu 
ltc'>  ~  011  the basjs of cnhrut.ted political  .l.U'ta1ysis  • In  a change of focus  conceming its 
as"ilitance. in  partteutar development programs induding those within the  framework of 
the  Lome  Conventwn  Measures  ~hou1d  Ctlntmue  to  s.~rve  the  goal  of sustained 
dcwloprnent  but  thclf  ~-.cio-pohtical imp;h;t  should  aho be  taken  into  account.  they 
!>hould  be  planot.-d, dt.  ..  a~ncti, hmed and  Jrnplem~nll'd tn  a way  that rhcy  help lo address 
the  rooi·C<tuses  of violent  conOicts  ("targeted  ussi-;tance··)  Syslcm;ttically.  a  program 
dc.!stgn should constder (1) who are the mam heneftciaru  ..  "!:> of the pwgram; (ii) m how far-
and m what sense. this program  ~111 shift the balance of oppor1unitics and power within 
the state; and (iu) tf and  tn how far  this  ~hift has a positive cff<.'t:'t  conct.>rmng  the long· 
term  goal  of structural  'Stabality  The Commiss1on  ha~ alr~.:ady :;tartcd  to  include  these 
d~liberatlons into the progranmung of resnur..:es of the Lome Convention as amended by 
the agreement ssgncd  1n  Mauntlus .,'"  4  November  1?9~_ 
It~  this  sense.  a  polrcy  of peac~-buddrng and  wnflit:t  prevention  docs  not  necessarily 
rcqum~ new prOt!rlnns. budget hn5 or pro.;;cdures or the neation of new institutions. The 
key  lies in  the  us~ of cxr<;ttng  uts11urnL~nh at  tlw  scrvtcc :tl.'cordmg to  a systematic and 
comprehensive approach  Some addrtional delrbcr;Hions  111  the following areas, hov.•ever, 
should be  taken  into account. 
- Suppoll  ftH  dcmouattsatwn  IS  css~;•ntial  for  cstahlislung  :1  stable and  legitimate 
political  framework  In  this respect, democracy  ~;hould not only be seen as a vnlue 
per w·  but  also  as  a  means  of cstablishmg  viab!r:  nwch<~nlsms for  the  peaceful 
conciliation  of group  interests  Support  for  democracy  hudding should  aiso  go 
beyond  the  election  process  While  procedural  correctness  and  compliance  with 
technical rules arc important ingredients of  the democratisation proci!!-'S, the contents 
of  this  process  are  at  least  of  equal  relevance_  Long-term  consolidation  of 
democratic  systems  should  be  sought  through  programs  on  participatory 
development and good governance (as identified by  the OECD/DAC Orientations 
on  Participatory Development and Good Governance of 1993).  In  this connection, 
it is also necessary to consider that the fruits of democratisation must be felt among 
the popdation at large if a democratic government is to gain legitimacy through the 
democratisation  process.  Therefore,  a  consistent  policy  of rewarding  democratic 
governments needs to  be pursued. 
- Legitimacy  and  effectiveness  of government  is  indispensable  for  structural 
stability_  This presuj)poses that government is  representative and that government 
services function  effectively  and  are accessible to  all,  including minority  groups. 
Therefore, strengthening government services (information services, use of  minority 
languages, revision  of existing laws and procedures with the aim  to  establish  an 
equitable legal system etc.) form.an important part of a policy of crisis prevention. 
Such  a policy  sho!Jld  also  include pr.:1grams  of decentralisation, of strengthening 
6 .  .  .  .  . 
local  g~vcrnment, and  training programs for non-violent conflict resolution at the 
grass-roots level. De-centralised co-operation projects could be particularly helpful 
in  this  respect Concerning programs for th..:  building of a civil  society, a balance 
should be sought between the development of civil society and  the development of 
the political system. 
2.  Dctectin&  PQSsible  trouble spot'i ("eru1y  waming syste-m') 
2. I, F11.h!ii!Cf.Ql<;lJL(.)J  t.h~. c_x~h~ngc_.Q( i  nfom.Jalio_Q j!Jl_(L <.t!laly~is 
In  accordance with the vil!ws expressed by  the Commission in  its  rcct.•nt  "avi::;"  for 
the  I  <JW>  IUC,  the  detection  of poss1blc  trouble  spots  at  a  very  early  stage 
.necessitates the  identification of structural  root-causes of conflicts  which,  for  its 
part,  is  dependent upon a throughout political :1nd  socio-economic analysis. Given 
the complexity of  the matter, this will  he an ongoing process that will be facilitated 
by  the continuous exchange and pooling of relevant information and analysis. Such 
a regular exchange and  pooling of information and  analysis should be stimulated 
- within  the  EUJopcan  Uuion  (possibly also  within  the  framework  of the 'Rocard 
initiative'): 
- v.·ith  the  UN.  the 0/\U (direct  exchange of raw  data through data basis, on 
refugee  movements for  example, could also  be  envisaged).  African sub-
regional  organizations, dsrectly  engaged  wuntries of the  region  and other 
important partners (the  US  in  partiCLtlar): 
- with  NGOs  I political  foundations,  the  academic  world  and  other instituti.)ns 
working on  th~ subject  (in  particular through  particiration and  support of 
conferences); 
- with  existing  rt~scan;h data bases; 
- betwl!cn  the. 0/\U crisis management centre, 0/\  lJ  nH.'Inbcr states and 
Afri em sub-regional organizations, 
-between the  OAU  crisi~; management centre and  other  rclev:~nt international 
organisations (the  UN  and  its specialized agencies  in  particular). 
£LJ1uj_lding_tJ]~ 'e:~rlv v.J!JJling'  __  ~~pac_ltie~_Q..f_Q!b<;.I  .<_t~LQ~ 
On  the  African  sicic,  the  OAU  is  about  to  establish  itself as  the  focal  point  for 
African efforts concerning conflict prevention in  Africa, and is currently developing 
a "crisis prevention" data bank.  While efforts of the European Union should centre 
on  the coordinated support (equipment,  training, organisation of s'eminars) of the 
OAU's  activities. efforts of other actors should also  be encouraged. Organisations 
within  the  country  concerned  or in  neighbouring countries arc  often  in  a  better 
position  to  notice  critical  activities  such  as  increased  inflow  of weapons,  the 
establishment of militias or specific local events. Sub-regional organizations could 
be  particularly  helpful  in  this  respect.  However,  close  cooperation  of  those 
institutions/organizations with  the  OAU's conflict  management centre should  be 
encouraged.  ldeally, the  OAU  could  serve  as  a focal  point for  an  early-warning 
network. 
3. Closing the gap between analysis and timely political action 
The establishment of "early warning systems" will be useless unless serious efforts 
are  undertaken  for  timely  political  action.  While  the  development  of specific 
., 
:-' indicators (
0triggcrs") for action would b,: an ideal 'Scenario, il  seems unlikely that 
such criggcrs will  be developed in  th•J  forcsceJ!ble future. Thcrcrore. the following 
aclivitic~ merit particular attention:  · 
3. L.St1mul.~~ing the  tfcJ>a..t~ 
Stimulatmg the  debate (in  all  pos!-iihk  fora  un~l with  nil  po~;siblc partner:\) around 
the issue of peace·building and conflict prevention should n<>l  be ur.dcrcstimated as 
a  means  of closing  the  gap  between  analysis  and  action.  l,ointing  to  structural 
deficiencies and discussions about solutions will heighten conccms at a very early 
stage,  even  before  tensions  become  obvious.  In  addition,  these  discussions  and 
deliberations will also facilitate the elaboration of policy strategies (including those 
of relief and  re-habilitation) for  confli<;t  and  post-conflsct situations. 
J_)_,__.Y_qj_~i!.lg.J:PJl.<.:grps l.  ..  PP..ht\caJ  .dJ.~Iggug 
Voicing  concerns  (public  or  discrct>tly  rn  consultation  with  third  stales  or 
organisations) means  try1ng  to  bring the  is~uc of concern  on  the  political  agenda 
and to  generate the polit1cal  will  for  timely pol1t1cal  :ic\wn  It  c:u1  be considered to 
be  most  successful  if sug!_\cstions  about  concrete  activittcs  an!  at  hand.  Raising 
awareness of parttcular  issues of peace-building aild  conll1c1  preventiOn  could be 
more  successful  1f  otl1er  organit.atmno.,;  :ll'c  amplil)·m!-:.  m!crnaf101lal  concern. 
OrganisatiOns  wh1ch  can  hl·  cxp~ctcd  to  h(.!  helpful  in  tlus  respect.  ~hould  be 
supported. 
J.J"-S,_t:QU.Q.r:.tjn_~ _and_  c~l)1_a_11_cj ng. c_;tJl;\ci t  1  c~  fo1_  t  1  Ill  L'ly  pollJ 1(!1La<;tj_Qr1 
Depending  on  the  specific  case  or  ~ituallon,  suppon/advocacy  of  m!ssions  of 
preventive diplomacy of' a number of ddTcrcnt actors should be envisaged whereby 
local efforts and traditional African ways and means of conciliation merit particular 
attention.  The  EU  should  also  encourage  the  c0opcration  of rclcv:mt  'preventive 
diplomacy' actors (111  particul:u  l!N/OAtJ!EU/sub-rcgion~tl organizations) and  help 
to ensure the continuity of efforts. The 0 A  lJ's current l'fTorts in  this field should be 
stimulated and  financially  and  politically supported, including the  identification of 
eminent  persons  for  missions  of preventive  diplomacy.  Support  should  also  be 
considered for  NGOs  working  in  the  field  of small-scale capacity-buiiding which 
encourages local  actors to  increase their  focus  on  key  prevent1on  strategies. 
IV.  TOWARDS A  POLICY  OF PEACE-BUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION  II: 
APPROACH  BY ACTORS 
The basic  challenge  for  a consistent  and  effective  policy of the  European  Union  as 
outlined above lies. first of all,  in  the  need for  a regular and  meaningful  exchange of 
information and  analysis  within  the  EU,  in  particular on  requests of other actors for 
support in  this field, on  countries where  tensions arc apparent but not yet obvious, on 
long-term  solutions  for  particular  problems.  on  past  as  well  as  intended  activities 
concerning efforts of peace-building and conflict prevention -and beyond -,including 
the financing of projects. 
Based  on  this  regular  exchange  of information  and  analysis,  the  European  Union 
should  take  the  necessary  steps  to  establish  visionary  but  still  realistic  policy 
frameworks for the  different countries and  regions,  in  order to  identify the  measures 
which would ensure an  optimal, coordinated and timely  usc of the available resources, ,','  •  }  '  "·  •7 ·-••  -·_  • ·,  ··~:  \·. 
i!l.~iu~liitg·(i~~eJop;llCI)t  assist~rtCC,  fo~ thc'goal of structuraJ.stability.  ..  .·  .· ·· 
·..  Ho~cvcr,' given' that  the  magnitude  and  complexity  of the  issue  requires  effective 
.  'il}.tcr~ational  co~rdination  and  coorcration,  the  ·European  Union,  in  pursuing  the 
·;·~: .... gener~l  ait~s' as outlined above, should also adopt a pro-active· approach  towards the 
major actors concerned. The following me:it particular attention: 
· 1. The United  Nati~ns 
,, ·  A~ the  United  Nations  will  have  a  ..  important  role  to  play  concerning  conflict 
prevention  I  preventive diplomacy  in  Africa  so  that  the  European  Union  should 
further encourage its efforts for  a more active and imaginative policy  in  this field, 
and seck a structured relationship cnncerning ~his matter. ln particular, the European 
Union  should continue to support plans for  an  intensification of the collection and 
utilisation of early-warning information and better integration between the different 
components of the UN system so as to help  to overcome the negative effects of the 
d1vision  of labour  between  various  UN  bodies,  as  well  as  between  the  UN,  the 
OAU  and  African sub-regional organisations (information exchange, consultations, 
dipicmatic  and operational  suppC'rt, joint missions). 
2.  llu~ OA U 
In  recent years, the  OAU has undertaken considerable efforts to  engage in  the field 
of conflict prevention, management and  r·~solution, mainly  within the framework of 
its  newly created "Mechanism of conflict prevention, management and  resolution". 
The  conclusions of the  Council of the  European  Union  on  "Preventive diplomacy, 
conflict  resolution  and  peace-keeping"  of 4  December  I  995  stipulate  that  the 
·Union's  support  should  be  i.a.  based  on  the  following  principles:  (i)  increasing 
African  involvement  in  the  preventiOn  and  resolution  of their  crisis;  and  (ii) 
improving the interlocking between the efforts of the  European Union and those of 
the  African  countries and other members of the  International  community.  ln  order 
to  ensure the operationalisation of these  as  well  a:,  other relevant principles of the 
Council  conclusions, the  Union  :>hould  establish  a coordinated support programme 
for the OAU's conflict mechanism that takes the latter's priorit1es into consideration. 
·The European  Union  should also  establish direct links of communication with  the 
OAU  that  arc  less  formal  than  the  EU-OAU  dialogue  meetings  with  the  aim  to 
establish  a permanent dialogue. 
3. Aftican sub-regional OJl!anisations 
African  sub-regional  organisat;ons  like  the  Southern  African  Development 
Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development 
(I  GAD D) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOW AS) have an 
important potential in  the field of peace-building, conflict prevention, manageinent 
and resolution. Within the framework of the European Union's long-standing policy 
of fostering  regional  organizations  to  enhance  "collective  economic  security", 
possibilities of engaging  these  organisations  in  the  relevant  activities,  including 
possibilities of EU  support in  this respect, should also  be  studied. Titc EU should 
cnga'gc  in  a  dialogue  with  these  organizations  on  this  matter,  with  the  aim.  to 
"-{' ~~?f,J~~~~~\{i~t~:~~.:?JiJ:.).::;;;:~;1{t:~;_{1:0:[t;c•~'.  i\i:,~·~.·;y,:~:.;:::~ J'.' :' ,. ,-:--,;;:  \/·~·  z~;: ·.:,_"··. ·  ·-~- ;c  .. ·  ..  ,  · ·_  ·  .  _H..  . .  , •..  .  .. .  •  .. 
:i'diX:\-;!~ci~t!t)ilitigc;:cil~::t·~tl·:'ci~pl<liiatlonor:ti161r p~tchtial; This dirilo~:~e ~~~()utd  _:lt!;O' inClude 
:::'::::'  ~;  'tlic:::j·_~.~tic ·_(j(  c.i~opcration'  a'm:)l~g  suh-ret~i~nal  orgimis~itinns  as  weft 'as  their: 
'"  .· .. c-oopcn;ii~>ri 'whh.:Hjc_ UN. ~md the OAlL  · ·· ..  ·  ·  :: .''  :· .  ~ .·  . .  -~:-'  . :· :.: .  .  '  " 
'  '' 
While Africans should have primary responsibility for the solution of the problems 
of  violent. conflicts,  the  European  Union  should  stimulate  deliberations  on  the 
establishment  of viable  long-term  soluti.')ns  to  structural  political  problems  in  . 
African countries, and on the establishment of the necessary mechanisms. The EU 
·should also advocate supoort by  African states for  the efforts of the OAU and, in 
given cases, other African sub-regional organisations. 
5. The United States 
Despite  the  recent  reduction  of  its  fmancial  commitments  in  the  field  of 
development assistance. the US  is  remains one of the most a€-ti-ve  imrortant actors 
concerning the issue of conflicts in  Africa. and shares  the mainstream analysis that 
looking for and  workinrs on  the  root-causes of violent conflicts in  Africa is  central 
for  effective  conf11c1  prevention.  In  accordnncc  with  the  "New  Transatlantic 
Agenda': and the respective "Action Plan", the European Union should reenforce the 
dialogue with  the  US  on  this  matter. 
6. NGOs and politiral foundations 
The importance of NGOs and  political  foundations working on  the  issue of peace-
building,  ~onflict  prevention  and  resolution.  in  particular  on  small-scale  local 
capacity-building (tr:-~ining of local leaders etc) as well  as democratisation and civil 
society  projects, should  not be  underestimated. While the  Eur::>pcan  Union  should 
support and facilita'c NGO activities (including, where necessary, through dialogue 
with  the government of the  resp~ctive country). care should be taken of how their 
programs complement acti ."itics of other donors.  Information exchange on activities 
of and support for NGO's and political foundations will help to  increase the targeted 
impact of  the European Union's policy. Established policy frameworks for countries 
..  and  regions would  help the  Union  to  consider support for  NGO  projects within a 
· 'strategic' framework.  In  countries where a number  of different NGO's operate, the 
European  Un_ion  could, as  appropriate, facilitate  the  establishment of a structured 
relationship (focal  points of information, principles of action etc.). 
7. Seminars mad  conferences 
Seminars and conferences have already been mentioned as an  important means of 
exchanging information and experiences. The European Union should support such 
·events,  regularly  participate  and  try  to  ensure  African  participation.  Support for 
seminars and  conferences in  African  countries could be particularly helpful. 
V.  BEYOND CONfLKT PREVENTION 
10 While the prevention of violent conflicts in  Africa should be considered as a primary 
field  of activity,  the  European  Union  need  also  be  ready  to  effectively  respond  to 
·situations  of open  violence  as  ·veil  as  post-conflict  situations.  Such  an  effective 
response will be greatly facilitated ii' deliberations on structural root-causes of  conflicts 
and possible ways and  means of addressing them had  already started so  tha: there arc 
at  least soine general  ideas of a political  framework that can guide  activities in  the 
field  of  conflict· management  I  peace-keeping  and  conflict  resolution  towa!'ds  a 
sustainable solution of the  conflict. In  the  same sense  in  that development ;:.nd  other 
assistance  should  be  deployed  targeted  at  the  root-causes  of connicts.  measures  of 
connict  management  and  resolution  should  take  the  long-term  goal  of structural 
stability  into  consideration,  the  n<:ed  of targeted  reinforcement of those  factors  that 
enable  pea~.-eful change. 
While it seems clear that the  UN  will  rl.!main  the most important framework  for major 
multi-national peace-keeping operations in  the foreseeable future,  African  efforts and 
close  cooperation  between  the  UN  and  the  OAU  concerning  this  matter  should  be 
further  encouraged.  The  European  Union  should  also  take  a  role  concerning  the 
enhancement of African  peace-keeping capabilities, inc! udi ng  the  capacity  for  rapid-
mobilisation  and  deployment  of  troops  (training,  equipment,  ·logistics, 
communications). and should offer assistance to  Africans to  identify their needs. Tasks 
which  require  military  expertise should  be  coordinated  within  the  framework  of the 
WEU.  African sub-regional organizations could make a substantial contribution to  the 
enhancement of African  peace-keeping capabilities and should also  be considered for 
support.  llowever,  any  support  programme  of the  Ell  :-:hould  always  take  African 
priorities into  consideration. 
I3esides  these  'technical'  requirements,  it  is.  also  necessary  to  address  the  h<1sic 
underlying  problem  of any  intervening peace-keeping force,  be  it  under the  auspices 
of  the  UN,  the  OAU  or  any  other  organisation:  The  problem  of  mandate  and 
legitimacy.  Without  a clear objective and  a  precise  mandate  that  corresponds to  the 
realities  on  the  ground,  all  efforts  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of peace-keeping 
operations risk  becoming a mere cosmetic exercise. The European  Union should take 
a role  in  keeping this  issue  nlso  on  the  African  agenda. 
VI. OPERATIONAL CoNCLUSIONS 
- Along  with  the  guidelines  and  principles  established  by  the  conclusions  of·the 
Council of the  European  Union on  "Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and 
peace-keeping  in  Africa"  of 4  December  1995,  and  to  complement  the  efforts 
undertaken  by  the  Commission,  in  particular concerning  the  programming of the 
resources  of the  Lome  Convention  as  amended  by  the  agreement  signed  in 
Mauritius on  4 November  1995,  according to  the approach  as outlined above,  the 
European Union should adopt a comprehensive and pro-active approach on the issue 
of conflicts in  Africa  in  which  the prevention  of violent  conflicts at  a very  early 
stage (peace-building) should be  at  the  centre of the  relevant activities. 
- In  accordance with  the  views expressed by  the Commission in  its recent "avis" for 
the  I 996  IGC,  the  European  Union  should  enhance  its  capacities  for  common 
political  analysis of root-ct1uses of conflicts by  identifying appropriate channels of 
1 1 "~  '  . ' 
~cgular:exchange of information and analysis, and, ultimately, by the establishment 
. ·  ofcomprehensive policy frameworks for each  country and region concerned, with 
the aim  of harmonizing existing policies of the Community and its Member States 
·concerning the issue of conflicts in  Africa. 
- Within  the orientations of these policy  frameworks,  a combination_of all  available 
instruments should be  used  more targeted  in  particular for the early prevention of 
violent  conflicts.  In  this  respect,  the  Community  and  its  Member  States  should 
include the concept of peace-building and conflict prevention into current assistance 
programs, in  particular development assistance programs including those within the 
framework of the Lome Convention, in the sense that their potential for addressing 
root-causes of conflicts is  fully  taken  into consideration. 
- As  far  as  possible  and  appropriate,  the  European  Union  should  also  establish 
effective  channels of exchange  of information  and  analysis  with  other  relevant 
members of the international community with  the aim  to  reach the highest possible 
degree of coordination of activities. 
The  European  Union  should undertake to  revise  its relevant  mechar.isms with  the 
aim  of ensuring timely  political  action. 
- The  European  Union  should  stimulate  and  support  reievant  activities  (including 
those  of preventive dirlomacy  and  peace-keeping)  by  other  actors,  in  particular 
Africa11  organizations  and  initiatives  such  a:;  the  OAU  and  African  sub-regional 
organizations (capacity-building) 
The  European  Union  should  undertake  to  continue  to  reflect  on  the  issue  of 
connicts  in  Africa,  in  particular  by  drawing on  the  rapidly  evolving international 
debate 
- In  spint  of this  communication,  the  Commission  will  make  an  assessment of the 
activities developed by  the EU  in the field of peace-building and conflict prevention 
in  Africa, and  in~ends to transmit to  the Council within  18 months a communication 
on the progress made, the improvements needed, and on  the difficulties that it may 
have encountered. 
12 